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EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the
Surprising Rise of Labour Provisions
Lore VAN DEN PUTTE & Jan ORBIE*
Surprisingly, labour provisions in EU bilateral trade agreements have widened and deepened
over the past decade. One would have expected the opposite, given the coming to power of
centre-right governments in the early 2000s and a stronger liberalization agenda since 2006.
This article addresses this rather remarkable development. First of all it dismisses the argument
that protectionist motives underlie the stronger social clauses in EU trade agreements. Instead,
drawing on the theory of the life-cycle of norms, it suggests that social trade has become an
unobjectionable norm within the EU.The article then offers several explanations for why the
social-trade nexus has been barely disputed, and indeed has further expanded through
subsequent trade arrangements. These include the stronger influence of the European
Parliament, path-dependencies stemming from the EU’s previous template, and the need to
gain public support in the face of criticism of free trade agreements. Most importantly, it stresses
that the framing of core labour rights as part of a broader ‘sustainable development’ agenda has
contributed to their unobjectionable status.While this framing has helped to forge a consensus
with regard to the social trade agenda, giving equal status to labour and environmental
provisions under the sustainable development umbrella might also have adverse consequences
for the concept of labour provisions.
1 INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) is, together with the United States (US), the biggest
proponent of linking trade and labour provisions.1 With the failure to include
labour standards in the multilateral rules of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the EU has attempted to incorporate them into its bilateral trade
* Lore Van den Putte is a PhD fellow funded by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) at the
Centre for EU Studies, Department of Political Science, Ghent University, Belgium. Jan Orbie is an
Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Director of the Centre for EU
Studies at Ghent University, Belgium. Previous versions of this article were presented at the UACES
Conference, Leeds, 2–4 Sep. 2013, the conference ‘Labour Standards and Sustainable Development:
Unpicking the EU’s Approach’, London, 17 Oct. 2014, and the workshop ‘Free Trade Agreements in
a Changing Landscape of Global Governance’, Keele, 22–23 Jan. 2015.We thank all participants for
their valuable contribution. The authors are also grateful to Peter Van Elsuwege, Heidi Maurer,
Maria Garcia and Myriam Oehri for feedback on earlier drafts. All remaining errors are the
responsibility of the authors. See also www.eu-sdg.ugent.be and giftaproject.org.
1 We use the terms ‘labour provisions’, ‘social provisions’, ‘social clause’, ‘core labour rights’, ‘labour
standards’, ‘social trade provisions’, ‘social rights’ and ‘social issues’ interchangeably.While these terms
have a slightly different substance, in this article they all refer to the labour provisions included in
EU trade agreements.
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agreements with third countries. In terms of content, judicialization and
governance, these labour provisions have been widened and deepened over the
past decade. This article examines why this has happened. This development is
puzzling because one would have expected the opposite. Indeed, while
centre-left governments in Member States were conducive to the rise of the
social clause in the 1990s, one might have expected that the coming to power of
more centre-right governments in the early 2000s and the stronger liberalization
agenda since 2006 would be associated with lower social ambitions. However,
labour provisions have continued to be included and increasingly widened and
deepened.
This article aims to understand this increasing social ambition despite less
favourable conditions. Methodologically, we build on a comparative analysis of
EU trade agreements, including our previous research,2 as well as secondary
literature and official documents from the EU institutions. Theoretically, our
main explanatory argument draws on the literature on the life-cycle of norms.
The first section gives an overview of the social content of EU trade
agreements and argues that these more ambitious social provisions cannot be
dismissed a priori as cheap rhetoric. It puts forward the argument that this
increasing relevance of labour standards is indeed intriguing because one might
have expected them to be set aside, given the demise of the centre-left
dominance and the radicalization of the EU’s free trade agenda. The second
section seeks an explanation for this apparent paradox. It dismisses the thesis that
protectionist motives underlie the stronger social clauses in EU trade agreements.
Instead, we suggest that social trade has become an unobjectionable norm for the
EU.We consider several factors to explain why the social-trade nexus has been
barely disputed, and indeed has even further expanded in the EU’s trade
arrangements. These factors include the stronger influence of the European
Parliament (EP), path-dependencies stemming from the EU’s previous template,
and the need to find public support in the face of criticism of free trade
agreements, Most importantly, we stress that the framing of core labour rights as
part of a broader ‘sustainable development’ agenda has contributed to their
unobjectionable status.The conclusions reflect on the potential and pitfalls of this
framing in terms of sustainable development.
2 See, L.Van den Putte, F. Bossuyt, J. Orbie & F. DeVille, Social Norms in EU Bilateral Trade Agreements:
A Comparative Overview, in Linking Trade and Non-Commercial Interests:The EU as a Global Role Model
35 (T.Takacs, A. Ott & A. Dimopoulos eds,TMC Asser Institute 2013).
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2 THE RISE OF LABOUR PROVISIONS
Over the past two decades the EU has concluded numerous trade agreements,
each of them including labour provisions. Although there is significant variation
in the way and extent to which labour provisions feature in these agreements, we
notice a widening and deepening since the mid-2000s. This section will first
assess this rise of labour standards based on three indicators, and subsequently
argue why this is testimony of increasing social ambition in EU trade
agreements.
2.1 A STRONGER TRADE-LABOUR LINKAGE
Comparing the social ambition of EU trade agreements, we can make a basic
distinction between two periods.3 During the first period, ranging from the
EuroMed agreements until the agreement with Chile (1990s–2003), we notice a
limited but gradually increasing social ambition. During the second period,
starting with the CARIFORUM agreement and continuing4 with the ‘Global
Europe’ free trade agreements (since 2008), the labour provisions have
significantly deepened and widened.This can be discerned from three analytically
distinct indicators (see Table 1).5
3 Ibid.
4 At the time the CARIFORUM EPA was seen as containing the strongest labour provisions of all
trade agreements concluded by the EU. This could be explained by the strong provisions already
agreed between the Dominican Republic and the US. See, B. Kerremans & M.M. Gistelinck, Labour
Rights in EPAs: Can the EU-CARIFORUM EPA be a guide? Beyond Market Access for Development:
EU-Africa Relations in Transition 310 (G. Faber & J. Orbie eds, Routledge 2009).However, it has
meanwhile become clear that the EU-CARIFORUM was not an exception: since then all EU trade
agreements contain similarly strong labour provisions.
5 The distinction between the two generations largely corresponds with the database of Kohl,
Brakman & Garretsen. See, T. Kohl, S. Brakman, & J.H. Garretsen, Do Trade Agreements Stimulate
International Trade Differently? Evidence from 296 Trade Agreements, The World Economy (2015
forthcoming). This database rates the EU-Mexico and EU-South Africa Agreements as not
enforceable, the EU-Chile Agreement as medium enforceable, and the EU-CARIFORUM as highly
enforceable. Exceptions are the EU-Israel, EU-Tunisia and EU-Morocco agreements which are
highly enforceable according to Kohl et al., but it should be noticed that the enforceability concerns
only limited and technical labour standards.
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First, the substantial content has widened and deepened. Not only do
agreements in the second period refer to a larger amount of social provisions, but
their legal importance has also increased. In the early agreements, social
provisions were taken up as issues for cooperation between the EU and the trade
partner. It concerned cooperation in the field of social policy, which was mostly
described in technical terms. For example, EuroMed agreements provided that
workers from the Southern Mediterranean would enjoy the same social security
benefits as the nationals of the EU Member States in which they were employed.
Over time, however, labour standards were more and more presented as social
human rights. This development undoubtedly relates to the 1998 Declaration of
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on the Four Core Labour Standards
(CLS). All agreements during the second period also contain a provision stating
explicitly that labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade
purposes, and that the Parties should not waive or derogate from their domestic
labour law to attract trade or investment. Briefly summarized, in addition to
technical cooperation in social policy, the new generation of trade agreements
includes a commitment to respect core labour standards as human rights.
Second, a further judicialization of labour provisions can be observed. With
judicialization we refer to the legal reliance on binding language and on
provisions for the settlement of disputes concerning the labour provisions of the
agreement. First of all the binding nature of labour provisions has increased in
the sense that labour provisions are formulated in a more binding way than
before.7 In addition, the enforceability of these provisions has increased, given
that the possibilities for legal scrutiny of labour standard violations through the
dispute settlement system have been expanded.8 The handling of disputes is also
to be carried out in a more transparent and neutral manner. While
pre-CARIFORUM disputes on social issues could only be discussed by
government representatives in so-called government consultations,9 in the new
generation of FTAs the issue can, as a next step, be referred to a Panel of
Experts. This is meant to make recommendations more professional and more
transparent than before, which in turn should lead to more objective outcomes.
7 The agreement with Colombia and Peru for example contains strong legal language, such as the
provision in Art. 277.1: ‘No Party shall encourage trade or investment by reducing the levels of
protection afforded in its environmental and labour laws. Accordingly, no Party shall waive or
otherwise derogate from its environmental and labour laws in a manner that reduces the protection
afforded in those laws, to encourage trade or investment.’This is rather new compared to agreements
signed before the mid-2000s.
8 However, one should note that the settlement of disputes on labour (and environmental) issues is
explicitly excluded from the strong and enforceable dispute settlement system that applies to the
other chapters of the trade agreements.
9 Note that since the Korea Agreement, government consultations are also explicitly mentioned in the
context of the sustainable development chapter.
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The list of experts is decided upon after the entry into force of the agreement,
and one-third of the selected experts should not be a national of any of the
Parties in order to serve as a chairman.When a Panel submits its final report the
Parties should implement its conclusions but no provisions are included to
enforce their compliance. As such enforceability has increased, but it appears that
only soft pressure can be exerted on the Parties.
Third, the governance of social provisions has deepened and widened. With
governance we refer to the political process whereby actors of various kinds and
on different levels are involved in the government of an issue, in our case the
implementation of the labour provisions. The new generation of trade
agreements involves more actors on more levels, with both business and civil
society actively involved in the promotion and monitoring of the
implementation of the labour provisions. Provisions on Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) encourage companies to comply with social (and
environmental) standards. Civil society actors officially take part in discussing
social issues arising under a trade agreement10 through their participation in
institutionalized civil society dialogue. As such they also have an explicit
monitoring duty. In the EU-South Korea FTA, for example, civil society
organizations on both sides meet once a year to discuss the implementation of
the labour provisions, after which their report is sent to the South Korean
government and the European Commission.11
2.2 A STRONGER POTENTIAL FOR IMPLEMENTATION
We argue that this widening and deepening reflects a significantly increased
social ambition on the part of the EU. Although the labour provisions in the
new generation of trade agreements are mostly cooperative and non-binding,
their potential impact cannot be underestimated. There are several reasons why
we think that the EU’s cooperative approach should not be dismissed as a cheap
rhetorical commitment.
First, and contrary to what is often assumed, legal enforceability is not
entirely excluded. Although the reports by the Panel of Experts are not legally
binding, ‘systematic non-compliance (of labour provisions) combined with clear
arbitration panel reports that point in that direction may affect the behaviour of
10 Note that the Chile agreement (2003), which was the last agreement concluded in the
pre-CARIFORUM-period, included an institutionalized civil society dialogue. However, we do not
regard this agreement as being part of the new generation FTAs because it does not include
provisions on CSR, nor does it include the possibility to establish a Panel of Experts.
11 See, L. Van den Putte, Involving Civil Society in the Implementation of Social Provisions in Trade
Agreements: Comparing the US and EU Approach in the Case of South Korea, 6 Global Lab. J. (2015).
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the EU and its Member States with regard to additional future trade concessions,
and with regard to financial support in general and technical assistance in
particular’.12 Moreover, serious violations of the CLS might be challenged under
the ‘essential elements clause’ given that these labour rights are part of the body
of human rights. Indeed, in today’s world the distinction between civil-political
and social and economic rights is difficult to maintain – a view that has been
endorsed by the EU.13 In the case of violations of the essential elements clause,
‘appropriate measures’ can be taken. While in the case of a dispute on social
provisions the non-enforceable dispute settlement provisions should be exhausted
first of all, the invocation of the essential elements clause and thus the suspension
of trade benefits is a distinct possibility.14 Its use as a final resort was also
confirmed by the then Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht in a speech on the
EU’s trade agreement with Colombia and Peru.15 Interestingly, he stated
explicitly that the threshold for unilateral suspension in this agreement is lower
than in previous agreements. A simple violation of labour rights, as included in
the essential elements clause, would suffice for the EU (or Colombia or Peru) to
take appropriate measures. This shows that the EU leaves the door open for the
hard enforcement of labour rights, at least in relation to countries where human
and labour rights violations have been fiercely criticized.
Second, the oft-made comparison between the ‘hard’ sanctions-based
approach advocated by the US versus the ‘soft’ incentives-based EU approach
should be qualified. When looking at the practical implementation of social
provisions in trade agreements, the ‘de jure’ distinction between hard
enforcement (US) and soft engagement (EU) gets blurred. De facto, and despite
numerous complaints and cases on labour provisions, the US also engages in
cooperative activities and shies away from legal enforcement.16
Third, the potential longer-term impact of a cooperative approach should
not be underestimated (even if trade sanctions are often applied to serve a
domestic audience rather than to contribute to social development in sanctioned
countries). Through ‘experimentalist governance’ involving regular reporting,
12 B. Kerremans & M.M. Gistelinck, Labour Rights in EPAs: Can the EU-CARIFORUM EPA be a
Guide? Beyond Market Access for Development: EU-Africa Relations in Transition 310 (G. Faber & J. Orbie
eds, Routledge 2009).
13 I. Manners, The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies: Reflections from a Normative Power Perspective, 14
Eur. For. Affairs Rev. (2009), 785.
14 Interview DG Trade, 25 Feb. 2013.
15 K. De Gucht, On the EU Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru. Speaking Points Before the
International Trade Committee of the European Parliament (INTA) (Brussels 2010).
16 M. Oehri, Comparing US and EU Labour Governance ‘Near and Far’ – Hierarchy vs Network? 1 J. Eur.
Pub. Pol. (2014). The recent Guatemala case might become an exception. Here the US has gone
further in the enforcement procedure. However, the continuous extension of deadlines since the case
was filed in 2008 shows that the US for now continues to be reluctant to enforce labour standards.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW270
monitoring and peer-reviewing of the implementation of standards agreed by the
EU and third countries,17 the EU may turn out to be an effective standard-setter
in the long run. This does not only involve consultations between governments
but also civil society meetings. Recent research has already indicated that a soft
approach can lead to increased respect for labour standards, especially because
civil society actors of both sides can learn from each other.18 The Civil Society
Forums now set up under the recent EU agreements provide a potentially
fruitful context for such long-term learning, since they involve regular physical
meetings of trade unions and business organizations from both sides. They could
also facilitate transnational advocacy building.19 The fact that civil society can
now come together in an official forum creates more concrete opportunities for
collaboration, as was the case in the framework of the North-American
Agreement on Labour Cooperation.20 Indeed, it might open up debates on
labour rights and can lead to collaboration that did not exist previously. A
noticeable example is the workshop on ILO Conventions that was organized as a
side event to the Civil Society Forum meeting of the EU-South Korea
agreement.21 Moreover, the civil society meetings provide a forum for critical
voices such as trade unions, which may use their dialogue with European
partners for internal legitimization within their domestic political context.
Ideally, the institutionalized dialogue enables the empowerment of marginalized
domestic actors such as trade union representatives.
Fourth, the relevance of these meetings can be clearly derived from the
strong resistance that some governments have displayed towards the establishment
of the Civil Society Forum. Disagreements between the EU and some of its
trading partners have arisen as to who should be represented in the civil society
17 J. Zeitlin, Extending Experimentalist Governance? The European Union and Transnational Regulation
(Oxford U. Press 2015).
18 E. Postnikov & I. Bastiaens, Does Dialogue Work? The Effectiveness of Labour Standards in EU Preferential
Trade Agreements, 21 J. Eur. Pub. Pol. 923 (2014).
19 C. Del Felice, Transnational Activism and EU Free Trade Agreements: Power Between the Tie and the T-Shirt
(unpublished thesis); C. Del Felice, Transnational Activism and Free Trade. Exploring the Emancipatory
Potentials of Global Civil Society, 23 Voluntas 302 (2012); R. Peels, Facing the Paradigm of Non-state
Actor Involvement The EU-Andean Region Negotiation Process (unpublished thesis): M. Finnemore & K.
Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 Intl. Org. 887 (1998).
20 L. Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International Trade, 25 L. & Pol. Intl. Bus. 165(1993); L.
Compa, NAFTA’s Labor Side Accord: A Three-year Accounting, 3 NAFTA, Law and Business Review of
the Americas, (1997), 6;T. Kay, Labor Transnationalism and Global Governance:The Impact of NAFTA on
Transnational Labor Relationships in North America, 111 Am. J. Soc. 715 (2005).
21 Andreas Bieler represents a more skeptic view in this regard. See, A. Bieler, The EU, Global Europe,
and Processes of Uneven and Combined Development: the Problem of Transnational Labour Solidarity, 39
Rev. Intl. Stud. 161 (2013). According to him, Northern and Southern trade unions are affected
differently by trade agreements with Northern groups being more supportive of the neoliberal logic
behind it. However, the opposition of the European Trade Union Confederation against the FTA
with Colombia and Peru in his view is a possible first step to transnational labour solidarity.
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fora, in particular when third-country governments attempted to appoint
representatives that are favourable towards the regime. This indicates that
governments expect (or at least fear) a possible impact of the transnational
meetings within the domestic political sphere. For example, in the beginning
South Korea was reluctant to include one of the two most important trade
union confederations in the mechanism.22 Also, there have been serious
disagreements on the composition of the CARIFORUM Civil Society Forum,
implying that for years no actual meetings have been held.23 Some Central
American governments such as Nicaragua have equally been reluctant to involve
critical actors such as trade unions in the civil society meetings. If these meetings
were merely a talking shop, they would not be taken seriously by the EU’s
trading partners.
Whether or not these provisions could effectively impact on third countries’
compliance with labour provisions depends on numerous factors.While some of
these are EU-specific, such as the political will on the EU side to take the
dialogues seriously and the extent to which they are made coherent with its
development policies, many of them are beyond the EU’s scope.What matters is
the extent to which government consultations are used to discuss labour issues,24
the extent to which the civil society forums manage to put social rights on the
agenda, the frequency with which they meet, their composition and capacity to
build transnational networks. On a more general level, results will also depend on
the evolving political context within the EU and its trading partners. The
agreements certainly allow for more discussion and contestation, but their
long-term impact remains to be analysed empirically. For now the potential of
the opportunities for a better implementation of labour standards that have arisen
from the new model EU trade agreements has not been fully exploited.25
However, our point is that the upgraded social dimension of recent trade
agreements should be taken seriously and not be dismissed a priori as an empty
shell, as some have argued.26
22 Interview with a South Korean labour representative, 26 Aug. 2014.
23 L. Campling, J. Harrison, B. Richardson & A. Smith, Working Beyond the Border? A New Research
Agenda for the Evaluation of Labour Standards in EU Trade Agreements, 3 University of Warwick School
of Law Legal Studies Research Paper (2014).
24 In this regard an interesting test case may be the Dominican Republic. A letter was sent to the
European Commission to request an independent investigation to address possible violation of CLS
in sugar cane plantations in the Dominican Republic. This investigation has been requested by the
Clarkson-Montesinos Institute under the EU-CARIFORUM agreement. For more information,
visit http://clarkson-montesinos.org/press-info/.
25 E. Postnikov, EU Trade Policy and Civil Society: Different Channels, Same Success? paper prepared for
presentation at the European Union Studies Association Fourteenth Biannual Conference, Boston,
5–7 Mar. 2015 (unpublished).
26 J. Adriaensen & M. Gonzalez Garibay, The Illusion of Choice: The European Union and the Trade-Labor
Linkage, 9 J. Contemp. Eur. Res. 542 (2013).
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3 IN SEARCH OF EXPLANATIONS
The previous section showed that labour provisions have become increasingly
prominent in EU trade agreements. It was also argued that, even if they are
mostly non-binding, their potential relevance cannot be underestimated. What
makes this observation surprising is that the rising social ambition of trade
agreements coincides with a rightward ideological shift within the EU and a
radicalization of its free trade agenda. If anything, one would have expected the
social trade agenda to be set aside in this context. However, exactly the opposite
happened. In this section we will search for an explanation for this puzzle.
3.1 THE PUZZLE
The rise of labour provisions in EU trade agreements is surprising because
previous research suggested that political actors’ support for ‘social clauses’ closely
correlates with their ideological orientation. Traditionally, the major advocates
have been social-democratic political parties, supported by their constituency in
the labour movement.27 Indeed, the centre-left dominance in the Council of
Ministers has been pointed out as a major explanation for why the EU started to
favour the trade-labour linkage by the end of the 1990s.28 At that time
social-democratic parties were part of 13 out of 15 governments in the EU.The
coming to power of New Labour in the UK (1997) and the SPD in Germany
(1998) was crucial in this regard.Whereas the previous conservative governments
in both these countries had strongly resisted a social clause, their
social-democratic successors supported it. Furthermore, the then
social-democratic Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy (1999–2004), consistently
emphasized the role of trade policy in the promotion of European values and the
need to ‘harness globalization’.Within this ideological context, the EU upgraded
the social conditionality system of its GSP regulation (1998) and demanded a
social clause at the WTO conference in Seattle (1999).29
Based on this explanation, one would expect the abandonment of social
clauses with the resurgence of centre-right governments across Europe in the
early 2000s. However, we have witnessed the opposite, namely a deepening and
widening of social provisions in the new trade agreements. What makes this
observation even more intriguing is that during this period the EU’s trade
27 B. Burgoon, The Rise and Stall of Labor Linkage in Globalization Politics, 2 Intl. Pol. 41 (2004).
28 J. Orbie, H. Vos & L. Taverniers, EU Trade Policy and A Social Clause: A Question of Competences? 3
Politique européenne 159 (2005).
29 Council, WTO: Preparation of the Third Ministerial Conference – Council Conclusions, 12121/99 (Presse
318) (1999).
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agenda made a shift from ‘harnessing globalization’ towards a more explicitly
neoliberal trade agenda. The Global Europe strategy of 2006 is known not only
for shifting the EU’s focus from multilateralism towards bilateralism, but also for
its neoliberal trade policy orthodoxy. Competitiveness at home and abroad is the
central message of the trade strategy, which also made it explicit that EU trade
agreements should henceforth be informed less by historical or developmental
concerns and more by economic interests.30 ‘Non-trade issues’ (a term used by
opponents to indicate that trade should not be bothered with issues such as
labour) were pushed to the sidelines and barely mentioned in the Global Europe
strategy. Interestingly, the economic crisis has not softened this free trade
orientation: it has rather entailed a radicalization of the neoliberal trade agenda
because new free trade agreements are seen as a solution to the crisis.31
The question thus remains why labour provisions were not removed from
new trade agreements and why they were even further extended. Pascal Lamy’s
successors, Trade Commissioners Peter Mandelson and Karel De Gucht,32 and
the Member States’ governments that constituted the Council over the past
decade, may not have been ardent supporters of a social clause. However, there
are no indications of any resistance against the continuing rise of labour
provisions in the new trade agreements. The EP has continued to be a major
advocate of the trade-labour linkage. The most obvious explanation seems to be
that the EU has been acting out of protectionist motives, whereby seemingly
legitimate social concerns are used to justify barriers to trade. Although the
context of the economic crisis makes this explanation particularly appealing, we
will argue that it cannot account for the deepening and widening of labour
provisions in EU trade agreements. Instead, we will suggest that labour provisions
have reached the status of an unobjectionable norm within the EU’s trade policy,
inter alia because they have been embedded within a broader sustainable
development frame.
3.2 PROTECTIONISM REJECTED
Thus, what makes the rise of labour standards even more surprising is that
protectionist motives have not been an important driver behind EU policy. From
a classical political economy perspective, one could expect that labour provisions
30 European Commission, Global Europe: Competing in the World. A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and
Jobs Strategy, COM (2006) 567.
31 F. De Ville & J. Orbie, The European Commission’s Neoliberal Trade Discourse Since the Crisis:
Legitimizing Continuity through Subtle Discursive Change, 16 Brit. J. Pol. & Indus. Rel. 149 (2013).
32 In between the commissionership of Mandelson and De Gucht, Catherine Ashton (2008–2009) and
Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2009–2010) were both Trade Commissioners for a brief time. Neither
seems to have put a strong stamp on the social trade issue.
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would have expanded in order to protect the EU’s sensitive economic sectors
against competition from countries with lower labour standards. Indeed, fears of
protectionist use of social clauses have always been a major reason why
developing countries, business organizations and classical trade economists have
resisted them.33 In the context of the economic crisis and competition from
emerging economies such as China, the temptation to protect sensitive domestic
sectors against ‘social dumping’ may be particularly strong.
However, there is not much evidence for this explanation. We do not find
any indication either in EU discourse or in EU practice of protectionist
reasoning that would explain the deepening and widening of labour provisions in
EU trade agreements since the mid-2000s. An examination of EU trade policy
discourse reveals that the inclusion of labour provisions is legitimized in terms of
human rights, and as argued below also increasingly in terms of sustainable
development. Under the protectionism hypothesis, we would expect a
‘competitiveness frame’ to be used with discursive references to ‘unfair
competition’ or ‘social dumping’. However, we do not find much evidence of the
EU institutions using such a frame. Rights-based and sustainable
development-based frames are dominant, whereas competition-based frames are
almost absent.
For example, the ‘Global Europe’ strategy emphasizes ‘social justice’ and
‘sustainable development’34 in the context of labour standards promotion. The
follow-up communication ‘Trade, Growth and Development’ links labour
standards promotion to the objectives of growth, social justice and
development.35 Both documents also stress the ‘cooperative’ nature of labour
provisions, which by definition implies that they cannot be used for protectionist
purposes.36 The labour-related articles of the EU’s trade agreements also reject
the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, which is fully in line with
the WTO consensus since the 1996 Singapore Summit. Furthermore Article 3 of
the Treaty on the European Union mentions that the EU should contribute to
33 Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade Today (Princeton U. Press 2002).
34 European Commission, Global Europe: Competing in the World. A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and
Jobs Strategy, COM (2006) 567.
35 European Commission, Trade, Growth and World Affairs. Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s
2020 Strategy, COM (2010) 612.
36 Also the European Commission Communication ‘Promoting Decent Work for All’ (2006) states that
‘The endorsement of social objectives cannot under any circumstances be used for protectionist
purposes. The objective is to achieve social progress across the board and ensure that it is spread
fairly for the benefit of all.’ (p.4) Labour provisions in trade arrangements should promote decent
work and sustainable development objectives (p. 8).
EU BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 275
free and fair trade (emphasis added). This should be interpreted as intending to
promote the integration of social provisions and trade liberalization.37
Also in policy practice, opportunities for using violations of labour standards
as a legitimation to reduce trade imports have not been used. The EU has
displayed a cooperative and incentive-based approach, which goes against
protectionist measures. The trade agreement with Colombia was strongly
criticized by civil society organizations and Members of the European Parliament
because of the government’s involvement in the violation of human rights
(including trade union rights). However, the European Commission insisted on
the conclusion of the trade deal, pointing at the leverage it provides for the
compliance with labour rights and for dialogue with the government. The Trade
Commissioner emphasized that the trade agreement could be suspended under
the essential elements clause (see above) – but he did not refer to social dumping
or anti-competitive trading practices.38
Clearly this is not to say that protectionist voices are completely absent. For
example, within the EP there have been proposals to restrict imports for reasons
of social dumping, thereby signalling a competitiveness frame.39 However, even
the EP has supported the cooperative approach towards the trade agreement with
Colombia, comforting itself with the approval of a Roadmap on Labour, Human
Rights and the Environment. Because of its lack of clear benchmarks (thereby
copying the Colombia-US Action Plan) the EP attracted harsh criticism for
putting trade interests above human rights and sustainable development.40 Also
sensitive industries have at times complained about social dumping, for example
the French car industry protested about unfair competition from South Korea.41
The French Minister for Industrial Recovery argued that Europe is open, but
should not be naïve and should not accept social and environmental dumping. In
this regard the European car industry protested that South Korean cars contain
cheap components made in countries such as China, which is seen as ‘unfair’. In
the end the EU-South Korea FTA was ratified and a safeguard regulation was
negotiated to deal with a sudden rise of South Korean car exports. However, this
37 A. Perulli, Fundamental Social Rights, Market Regulation and EU External Action, 30 Int’l J. Comp. Lab.
L. Indust. Rel. 27, 41 (2014).
38 K. De Gucht, On the EU Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru. Speaking Points Before the
International Trade Committee of the European Parliament (INTA), (Brussels 2010).
39 With a competitiveness frame we mean that the inclusion of labour standards in trade agreements is
justified by the reasoning that developing countries would gain an ‘unfair’ competitive advantage
because lower labour standards allow them to produce at lower costs. See, L.Van den Putte, Divided
We Stand: The European Parliament’s Position on Social Trade in the Post-Lisbon Era (Edward Elgar
forthcoming).
40 Agence Europe, (AE) Opponents to Free Trade not Letting Go, No. 10750 (2012).
41 Agence Europe, (AE) South Korea: France Slams Unfair Car Trade, No. 10664 (2012).
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could be interpreted as a rather symbolic suggestion: in practice the EU invokes
safeguards only in very rare instances.42
Thus, EU trade policy discourse and practice do not show any sign of
protectionist motives: quite the contrary. This resonates with the finding that the
GSP43 has barely been used for restricting trade flows from developing countries.
Contrary to the expectations of those who fear a ‘protectionist wolf in social
clothing’, the EU appears remarkably reluctant to apply trade sanctions for
violations of labour rights, even in cases where it may be argued that sanctions
would be legitimate. Since 1995 the GSP has provided that ‘serious and
systematic violations’ of labour standards could lead to a withdrawal of trade
preferences. Over the past two decades this has happened on only two occasions:
Burma (1997–2013) and Belarus (2006-now). These countries are not
economically important to the EU and the sanctions fit rather within the EU’s
broader foreign policy sanctions. At the same time, numerous calls for sanctions
(e.g., in the cases of China, Pakistan, Colombia) have not been taken into
consideration.44 After the Rana Plaza disaster the Trade Commissioner and the
EU’s High Representative at first instance considered appropriate action under
the GSP system ‘in order to incentivise responsible management of supply chains
involving developing countries’.45 They resisted calls to close the EU market for
imports from Bangladesh, emphasizing that this ‘would hurt the wider population
even if it were only aimed at unscrupulous employers’. Instead De Gucht
proposed a Global Sustainability Compact to improve labour rights in a more
cooperative way.46 Thus, although the EU could have withdrawn Bangladesh’s
trade preferences for the violation of trade union rights and occupational safety,
it opted for an incentive-based approach. If anything could be criticized about
the EU’s use of GSP labour rights conditionality, it is the continuation of
preferential imports rather than protectionist abuse.
42 See, Hindley (2007) in G. Siles-Brügge, Resisting Protectionism after the Crisis: Strategic Economic
Discourse and the EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement, 5 New Pol. Econ. 16 (2011); F. De Ville & J. Orbie,
The European Commission’s Neoliberal Trade Discourse Since the Crisis: Legitimizing Continuity through
Subtle Discursive Change, 16 Brit. J. Pol. & Indus. Rel. 149 (2013).
43 S.Velluti, The EU’s Social Dimension in its External Trade Relations, in Global Governance of Labor Rights
(A. Marx, J.Wouters, G. Rayp & L. Beke eds, Edward Elgar forthcoming).
44 C. Portela & J. Orbie, Sanctions under the EU Generalised System of Preferences and Foreign Policy:
Coherence by Accident? 20 Contemp. Pol. 69–70 (2014).
45 C. Ashton & K. De Gucht, Joint Statement by HR/VP Catherine Ashton and EU Trade Commissioner
Karel De Gucht Following the Recent Building Collapse in Bangladesh (2013).
46 European Commission, EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht launches Global Sustainability Compact in
Response to Bangladesh Tragedy (2013).
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This rejection of protectionism also corroborates with research on the EU’s
general free trade orientation, which finds that EU trade policy has become
increasingly neoliberal.47
3.3 SOCIAL TRADE AS AN UNOBJECTIONABLE NORM
Instead of the easy suspect of protectionism, we suggest a normative explanation.
The core of our argument is that labour provisions have achieved the status of an
‘unobjectionable norm’ in EU trade agreements. This analysis is based on
Finnemore and Sikkink’s work on the life-cycle of norms.48 In the first stage of
‘norm emergence’, norm entrepreneurs actively promote a norm. In case these
norm proponents can convince a critical mass, the norm reaches a tipping point.
During this second phase, the norm is being socialized: it achieves a
‘taken-for-granted’ quality and becomes unobjectionable. Once norms are
incorporated in legal documents and official discourse, norm entrepreneurs can
refer to these sources in order to further advocate norm spread. Norm
opponents, in contrast, cannot dismiss or attack the norm openly. They can only
try to diminish the influence of the norm, for instance by proposing vague
definitions and fuzzy descriptions.49
In our case, the first phase corresponds with the fierce EU debate on a
social clause between 1993 and 1997, with France, Belgium, the European
Parliament and trade unions as the main norm entrepreneurs.50 The second
phase started with the social-democratic majority within the Council and the
European Parliament and the tenure of Lamy (1999–2004). During this period,
labour provisions became legalized through their inclusion in bilateral agreements
and in policy documents. For example, the four ILO core labour rights were
explicitly recognized as being part of the ‘essential elements clause’ of agreements
47 G. Siles-Brügge, Resisting Protectionism after the Crisis: Strategic Economic Discourse and the EU–Korea
Free Trade Agreement, 5 Pol. Econ. 16 (2011); F. De Ville & J. Orbie, The European Commission’s
Neoliberal Trade Discourse Since the Crisis: Legitimizing Continuity through Subtle Discursive Change 16,
Brit. J. Pol. & Indus. Rel. 149 (2013).
48 M. Finnemore & K. Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 International
Organization, 887 (1998); O. Elgström, Consolidating ‘Unobjectionable’ Norms: Negotiating Norm Spread
in the European Union, in European Union Negotiations: Processes, Networks and Institutions 29 (O.
Elgström & C. Jönsson eds, Routledge 2005).
49 Other possibilities are to include exceptions, to argue for long transition periods, or to ask for a
limited application in certain areas. See, ibid.
50 P. Waer, Social Clauses in International Trade: The Debate in the European Union, 4 J. World Trade 30
(1996); G. Tsogas, Labour Standards in the Generalized Systems of Preferences of the European Union and
the United States, 3 Eur. J. Indus. Rel. 6 (2000); J. Orbie, H.Vos & L.Taverniers, EU Trade Policy and a
Social Clause:A Question of Competences? 3 Politique européenne 159 (2005).
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between the EU and third countries.51 Many other documents confirmed the
need to include labour provisions in trade arrangements,52 thereby further
internalizing the norm. Also, the protectionist use of labour standards was firmly
rejected.53
Importantly, the social-trade norm was framed in terms of ‘human rights’.
This was crucial for the norm in order to emerge and become accepted.Whereas
there were still elements of protectionist thinking in the pleas for a ‘social clause’
by France, Belgium and the European Parliament in the mid-1990s, by the end
of the Millennium a consensus had emerged that labour provisions should not be
used for protectionist purposes and that they should be seen as human rights.
This also coincided with the 1998 ILO Declaration which identified the Four
Core Labour Standards as fundamental principles which all members are obliged
to respect, promote and realize, even if they have not ratified the eight
Conventions in question.54 Supporting core labour standards as a means of
human rights promotion and not as a means of protectionism was further
legitimized through studies by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development which showed that developing countries respecting the core labour
standards do not suffer from a competitive disadvantage in international trade.55
The social trade norm achieved an unobjectionable status within this
context, even when the social-democratic majority disappeared by the early
2000s and the global economic and financial crisis took hold at the end of 2008.
One reason why the social trade norm has continued to feature in EU trade
discourse and policy praxis without noticeable contestation, is that the debate on
labour provisions was less politicized than in the 1990s. Precisely because of the
consensus that labour standards should not be used as an excuse for
protectionism and that a cooperative approach should be pursued, the debate
proved less ideologically conflicted. Second, a path-dependent evolution has set
off since the end 1990s whereby references to ILO Core Labour Standards
became part of the EU’s standard ‘template’ to be used for any future trade
51 European Commission, Promoting Core Labour Standards and Improving Social Governance in the Context
of Globalisation, COM (2001) 416.
52 European Commission, Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM (2001)
366 final; European Commission, Towards a Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, COM
(2002) 82 final; European Commission, Promoting Decent Work for All. The EU Contribution to the
Implementation of the Decent Work Agenda in the World, COM (2006) 249 final.
53 Council, WTO: Preparation of the Third Ministerial Conference – Council Conclusions, 12121/99 (Presse
318) (1999); European Commission, Promoting Core Labour Standards and Improving Social Governance
in the Context of Globalisation, COM (2001) 416.
54 ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, (1998).
55 OECD, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards. A Study of Core Workers’ Rights and International Trade,
(1996); OECD, International Trade and Core Labour Standards (1996); International Labor Office and
the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization, Trade and Employment: Challenges for Policy Research
(2007).
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negotiations. Even if governments and Commissioners might be less enthusiastic
about the trade-labour linkage than their predecessors, it would be politically
costly to remove labour standards from new trade arrangements: a minority of
left-wing politicians within the Council and the EP would find it easy to
mobilize against the EU’s negligence of its previously proclaimed social
ambitions.
This explains why the social clause has continued to feature in EU trade
policy. However, it remains unclear why the EU’s social ambitions have actually
increased. In order to understand this, three further points should be mentioned.
First, the European Parliament’s impact on trade policy has steadily grown since
the 1990s.56 Since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament formally needs to
be involved in the negotiation and ratification of trade agreements. Some of the
social issues in new trade agreements were specifically demanded by the
European Parliament, such as an independent body to settle disputes on labour
issues57 and CSR provisions.58 Even if there is no longer a (central) left majority,
the EP has continued to emphasize the human rights dimension of trade
agreements. This is what can be expected from the legislature, which is typically
more concerned with the normative dimension of international trade59 and with
the potentially negative impact of trade agreements.
In addition, a social chapter makes it easier to find public support for the
new generation of trade agreements by serving as a counterbalance for the
far-reaching market provisions. It should be recalled that the Global Europe
agreements are more ambitious than ever when it comes to trade liberalization,
not only in terms of market access for goods and agricultural products, but also
in terms of trade-related issues such as services, investment, competition and
government procurement provisions. It is true that the labour provisions of EU
trade agreements have deepened and widened over the past decade, but this has
been parallel to an unprecedented widening and deepening of the market
56 L.Van den Putte, F. DeVille & J. Orbie, The European Parliament as an International Actor in Trade: From
Power to Impact, in The European Parliament and its International Relations 52 (S. Stavridis & D. Irrera
eds, Routledge 2015).
57 European Parliament, Human Rights, Social and Environmental Standards in International Trade
Agreements, (2010).
58 European Parliament, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Trade Agreements, (2010). However,
the European Parliament’s demand to have the same dispute settlement for the sustainable
development chapter as for other parts of the agreement has not been met. See, European
Parliament, Human Rights, Social and Environmental Standards in International Trade Agreements.
59 M. Krajewski, New Functions and New Power for the European Parliament: Assessing the Changes of the
Common Commercial Policy from the Perspective of Democratic Legitimacy, in European Yearbook of
International Economic Law 67 (M. Bungenberg and C. Herrmann eds, Springer 2013); L. Richardson,
The Post-Lisbon Role of the European Parliament in the EU’s Common Commercial Policy: Implications for
Bilateral Trade Negotiations, 5 College of Europe: EU Diplomacy Papers (2012); M. Meunier & K.
Nicolaïdis, The European Union as a Trade Power, in International Relations and the European Union 275,
282 (C. Hill & M. Smith eds, Oxford U. Press 2011).
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creating provisions in these agreements. Including social issues in the agreements
makes it easier to find a broad political acceptance for the new generation of
‘Global Europe Agreements’, in particular because civil society organizations,
members of parliament and other politicians regularly express their concern that
trade liberalization would be detrimental for social development within the EU’s
trading partners. For example, European trade unions, who are in general
supportive of the EU’s trade agenda, argue for the inclusion of a social clause to
mitigate possible negative effects of free trade.60
There is one final reason why the social trade norm has continued to exist
and even been expanded, although we will further argue that the very same
reason might dilute its actual content in the long run.Whereas labour standards
were originally framed as human rights, since the mid-2000s we witness a
discursive shift towards a sustainable development frame. In the current
agreements labour standards, together with environmental standards, are included
in so-called chapters on ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’. Under the new
ideological constellation we do not notice an outright contestation of the social
trade norm: what seems to have happened, however, is a reframing which makes
the context of labour provisions more blurred. As predicted by the life-cycle of
norms model, the unobjectionable status of norms has been indirectly contested
through subtle reformulations, making it more ambiguous.
It was Mandelson himself who introduced the idea for the inclusion of
sustainable development chapters in free trade agreements in a speech he gave in
2005.61 As mentioned above, the 2006 Global Europe trade strategy frames
labour provisions not only in terms of social justice but also in terms of
sustainable development. From the trade agreement with Korea onwards, all
FTAs contain a chapter on sustainable development,62 specifically devoted to
60 J. Hilary, European Trade Unions and Free Trade: Between International Solidarity and Perceived Self-Interest,
11 Globalizations 47(2014).
61 F. Bossuyt, The Social Dimension of the New Generation of EU FTAs with Asia and Latin America:
Ambitious Continuation for the Sake of Policy Coherence. 14 Eur. For. Affairs Rev. 708 (2009).
62 In the Korea agreement labour provisions are included in the Chapter 13 on ‘Trade and Sustainable
Development’. In the Colombia/Peru agreement they are included in Title IX ‘Trade and
Sustainable Development’. In the Association Agreement with Central-America they are included in
Part III ‘Cooperation’. In the Ukrainian agreement they are mentioned in Chapter 13 ‘Trade and
Sustainable Development’ under Title IV ‘Trade and Trade-Related Matters’. In the Association
Agreement with Georgia they are mentioned under Chapter 13 ‘Trade and Sustainable
Development’. In the agreement with Moldova they are also mentioned under Chapter 13 ‘Trade
and Sustainable Development’. In the agreement with Singapore they are mentioned in Chapter 13
‘Trade and Sustainable Development’. In CETA they are mentioned under 23 ‘Trade and Sustainable
Development’ and under 24 ‘Trade and Labour’.
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social and environmental goals. Also the European Parliament has insisted on a
sustainable development chapter in every new trade agreement.63
The framing of labour provisions as an aspect of sustainable development,
thereby putting them on the same level as environmental standards,64 is
problematic from a human rights perspective and also has legal consequences.65
While implicitly they are also part of the essential elements clause, mentioning
them also in the chapter on trade and sustainable development harms the
indivisibility of human rights. In addition it is not clear how a violation of social
norms should be handled: by taking appropriate measures as the violation of
essential elements prescribes, or by referring it to the specific dispute settlement
mechanism as described in the chapter on sustainable development? While labour
and environmental provisions display some commonalities, they are too different
with regard to their objectives and measures to combine them in one oversight
mechanism.66
4 CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that the surprising deepening and widening of labour provisions
in EU trade agreements can be explained by the unobjectionable status that
social trade has reached within the EU. One factor that has been of pivotal
importance to this unobjectionable status is that social rights have been reframed
under the more fuzzy heading of sustainable development.
The buzzword of sustainable development has allowed for a large political
consensus within Europe to support the inclusion of labour standards in trade
agreements. Reluctant trade partners might also be more willing to accept a
sustainable development chapter than a separate chapter on social rights. It is
hard for any actor to be opposed to sustainable development in a context in
which this principle is universally accepted, e.g., also the UN is proclaiming
Sustainable Development Goals as the successors of the Millennium
Development Goals. In a different context, Mert summarized the consensual
potential of this concept as follows:
63 European Parliament, External Dimension of Social Policy, Promoting Labour and Social Standards and
European Corporate Social Responsibility, 2010/2205 (2010).
64 Also the labour rights conditionality of the EU’s GSP system was reformulated as part of ‘sustainable
development and good governance’ conditionality since 2005. See, European Commission,
Developing countries, international trade and sustainable development: the function of the Community’s
generalised system of preferences (GSP) for the ten-year period from 2006 to 2015, COM (2004) 461 final.
65 L. Bartels, Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements, 24
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series (2012).
66 J. M. Siroën, et al., The Use, Scope and Effectiveness of Labour and Social Provisions and Sustainable
Development Aspects in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements 101 (2008).
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Sustainable development acts as an empty signifier that articulates a diversity of political
demands, and around which actors with different and apparently conflicting interests can
come together and cooperate. It is emptied of meaning so that each actor can interpret
it according to their own perceived interests and requirements.67
With Cecilia Malmström as Trade Commissioner (since November 2014),
concerns about sustainable development in trade may even get an additional
boost.68 It remains to be seen what this will mean in practice for labour
provisions in trade.While more attention for sustainable development is an aim
one can hardly discourage, the reframing of core labour rights in terms of
sustainable development is not without risks. Core labour standards that have
acquired the status of human rights, and are expected to be respected by all the
ILO members by virtue of their membership, are conceptualized at the same
level as environmental provisions. Similar to Alston’s famous critique69 of the
shift from international labour conventions to fundamental principles of the ILO,
one might wonder if the sustainable development frame would entail a watering
down of the human rights elements of EU trade agreements. Indeed, the EU’s
view of sustainable development risks becoming a ‘basket’ in which all kinds of
goals and values can be put without a clear focus.70
Norms are not eternally unobjectionable. As predicted in the life-cycle of
norms model, making them more ambiguous may herald their erosion. The
sustainability of the EU’s social rights commitments through trade agreements
remains to be seen. Much will depend on how the labour provisions are actually
implemented, involving inter alia the reports by the Panel of Experts and the
Civil Society Forums. Moreover, the EU’s ambition in the social-trade nexus will
be tested with the bilateral trade negotiations with India and the US. For the
medium term, however, we predict that labour provisions in EU trade
agreements are here to stay.
67 A. Mert, Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Shifts in Discourses of Environment and Democracy, in
Environmental and Forest Governance:The Role of Discourses and Expertise 69,72 (M. Böcher, L. Giessen
& D. Kleinschmidt eds, Universitätsdrucke Göttingen 2008) (italics in original).
68 See, for example, C. Malmström, The Commission’s Future Trade Strategy, (Brussels, 2015) in which
she raises the question whether there is a way to go beyond the current EU approach on trade and
labour, thereby inspired by the Global Sustainability Compact designed for and together with
Bangladesh, or the proposal on conflict minerals.
69 P. Alston, Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15
Eur. J. Intl. L. 457 (2004).
70 M. Cremona & G.M. Durán, Fair Trade in the European Union, in The Processes and Practices of Fair
Trade:Trust, Ethics and Governance 122, 156 (B. Granville & J. Dine eds, Routledge 2012).
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